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OCA 86-2057 13 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1	SUBJECT: Briefing of SSCI Staff on the Intelligence Community Role in Narcotics
25X1	1. On 13 June 1986 Messrs. William Kotapish, National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics, and Chief, DI/OGI/Strategic Narcotics Division, briefed the following Senate Select Committee for Intelligence (SSCI) staffers on the Intelligence Community's role in narcotics: Messrs. Edward Levine, John Elliff, James Dykstra, David Holliday, Marvin Ott, Mrs. Anne Greene and Ms. Charlene Packard. Also
25X1	attending the 0900 briefing in 219 Hart Senate Office Building was OCA/Senate Affairs.
25X1	2. Mr. Levine, referring to the 9 June 1986 Washington Post article entitled "Military Role in Drug Fight Outlined," said that the SSCI was interested in how the NSDD affects the intelligence agencies.
25X1	3. Mr. Kotapish explained NIMBUS and the Vice President's interest in the interdiction effort. He said that the NSDD will not have a major impact on the Intelligence Community. The NSDD does give the Department of Defense (DoD) a mission statement for its operations. It gives DoD a clear charter to be cooperative in supporting U.S. law enforcement interdiction operations and, in the long haul, the charter to work with foreign military organizations, which in certain countries are the key to narcotics interdiction, i.e., Colombia, Mexico. Mr. Kotapish stated that in the last three years there has been a build up of interest and resource commitment in the Intelligence Community to the narcotics effort. In terms of resources, the Intelligence Community is probably where it should be. He noted that there are modest increases in FY 86 and 87, but he does not believe there will be equal increments in the future.
25 X 1	4. said that he also believed there would be
25 X 1	no great impact on the Intelligence Community because it has been supporting the narcotics effort for the last several years, and the NSDD reiterates what has been done.

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describ ties an Mr. Lev evident Kotapis this su the Int that is	es the product of the vulre of the standard	nunity. We below, but herabilitie that the stated to community.	e are not a now we look of some amount of a narcotics winished in there and Custon	simply doing ok at option of these of support distribution he hatelligence is an intermonant of the control of	corner in the ganalysis the ns, opportuning rganizations. cussed is not s read. Mr. does not show action between Coast Guard r. Kotapish
gave th	e example				

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he does not believe that will happen in the near term. He

25X1	sees OGI as the hub in the Directorate of Intelligence with the area divisions providing the information	
25 X 1	The NIO would	
25 X 1	pull it all together.	
25 X 1	9noted that the Agency support effort is in the foreign area and the Agency does not get involved in the	
25 X 1	actual law enforcement.	
25 X 1		
	10. Mr. Kotapish stated that, even before the NSDD, narcotics was in the top twenty per cent in requirement	
25 X 1	priorities. It is a powerful dynamic to the social and political stability of some of the countries.	
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	11. Mr. Kotapish said that the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, chaired by the Attorney General, is presently	
	looking at the idea of an all-source intelligence center with	
	the major thrust being interdiction support. It would be run by DEA. Mr. Kotapish said that EPIC, situated in El Paso,	
	Texas, could be upgraded or it could be decided to bring the	
	national center to Washington. Whatever the decision, the Agency will play a role, perhaps as technical advisers. Mr.	
25 X 1	Elliff later asked Mr. Kotapish's personal view on where he believes the center will be located.	
	believes the center will be rooted.	
25 X 1		
	/Liaison Officer	
	Office of Congressional Affairs	
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Remarks To 13: Please have coordinated response prepared. (Also, may want to be prepared to deal with during Wednesday lunch).

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Soviet Arms Pact Breaches:

Charges Questioned

By CHARLES MOHR Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 5 — The Soviet Union has not breached key provisions of the 1979 arms pact, according to data cited by critics of President Reagan's announced policy of ending adherence to the treaty terms.

According to Government figures cited by the critics, the Soviet Union dismantled or replaced more than 1,200 launchers of nuclear weapons to remain within the limits of a 1972 interim agreement and the 1979 treaty.

There is general agreement that the

There is general agreement that the even more significant detailed limits on missiles carrying multiple warheads and on aircraft with the flying bombs called cruise missiles have not been breached by the Soviet Union.

been breached by the soviet Union. The critics, who include members of Congress and former officials, contend that if the President carries out his intention to end adherence to the terms of the unratified 1979 treaty, the nuclear balance may shift in Moscow's favor.

U.S. Accused Soviet of Breaches

The treaty was signed at the end of a rice treaty was signed at the end of a second scries of strategic arms limitation talks, known as SALT II. Although neither side has ratified the treaty, they said they would keep within its provisions as long as the other side did.

Mr. Reagan recently decided to abandon the treaty, on the ground that the Soviet Union has been breaking key provisions. The Soviet Union has denied the American charges.

According to the critics of President

Reagan's decision, a mutual abandon-ment of treaty restraints could degrade the United States' ability to gather in-telligence on Soviet forces and give the Russians enough nuclear warheads to threaten the ability of a proposed threaten the ability of a proposed United States mobile missile to survive attack when it becomes operational in the early 1990's.

No Convincing Case, Critic Says

The critics believe that most of the purported Soviet breaches are ambiguous or of marginal importance to American national security, and that greater efforts should be made to re-solve them through negotiations. One of the critics of the new Amer-

ican policy, Jack Mendelsohn, a for-mer arms negotiator who is now a

deputy director of the Arms Control As-

sociation, a private group, said:
"I believe the Administration has not
made a convincing case and could not
attack SALT II on the central core
provisions."

Senator Albert Gore Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, said the Soviet Union has "scrupulously abided by the numerical limits with a few marginal exceptions." He said that in complaining of increases in warkend recombinations. tions. The said that in compraming of increases in warheads permitted by the treaty, the Administration did not explain that new launchers displaced older weapons on a one-for-one basis.

He and other critics such as Paul C.
Warnke and Gerard C. Smith, former arms negotiators, and Representative Les Aspin also say that abandonment of the 1979 treaty provisions would be disadvantagement. disadvantageous to the United States in the near term.

Arithmetic Said to Favor Soviet

They reason that the Soviet Union's heaviest missile, the SS-18, is limited by treaty to 10 warheads. Intelligence specialists believe it can now accommodate four more. If the 308 SS-18 missiles are affined with favor siles are refitted with four more war-heads each, the warhead total would

rise by 1,232.

The United States, on the other hand, plans to deploy 50 10-warhead MX missiles starting in late 1986. But the MX must be deployed in silos now used by three-warhead Minuteman 3 missiles, for a net increase of only 350 warheads. "It seems to me," Mr. Smith says, "that this decision does not reflect any cost counties."

cost counting."

The critics are especially disturbed by two passages in President Reagan's statement announcing the new policy.

One was that he did not "anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces," which may be an admission that no pragmatic response to an accelerated arms race is sponse to an accelerated arms race is

The other is that the United States "will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union." Since that sentence did not mention submarine-carried missiles or bomber forces in which the United States is superior, the critics United States is superior, the critics fear that it threatens a move to match the Soviet Union in its strong suit of land-based missiles and may thus mean an effort to substitute American superiority for nuclear parity.

Three Issues Being Disputed

The issue of whether the Soviet Union The issue of whether the Soviet Union has breached provisions of the 1979 arms pact involves three basic issues — encryption, or the coding of missile test-flight signals; the provision allowing for one new type of land-based missile, and the total number of delivery vehicles.

The test-flight signals transmit a variety of engineering data to ground stations of the testing nation, and can be monitored by the other nation. The 1979 treaty gives each party the right to use coding, except when it will "im-pede verification" of adherence to treaty provisions

The signals include such information as combustion, temperatures of the rocket fuel, fuel consumption per second, missile acceleration and speed.

From this information, it is possible to estimate the accuracy of missiles. The treaty gives the other side no right to uncoded access to the data. Only information needed to verify such treaty provisions as the number of reentry vehicles, each of which carries a warhead, the number of rocket stages and the launch weight and throw-weight should be unimpeded.

Other Sources of Information

Such information as the number of re-entry vehicles can be gathered by American radars and by other means independent of telemetry.

The critics of the Administration say that Soviet negotiators asked the United States to specify what data it needs that is being denied, but that American officials refuse to do so on the ground that this would reveal too much about the information the United States is gathering. States is gathering.

An official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said, "We have enough data to make the accusation of noncompliance, but there is additional data we would like to have that involves treaty verification."

He declined to be specific, calling it a "Catch 22 situation" in which the Government feels it cannot offer detailed

ernment feels it cannot offer detailed proof of its accusation.

Richard N. Perle, an Assistant Sec-retary of Defense who has been critical retary of Detense who has been critical of arms control agreements, said in an interview that the Russians "don't necessarily encrypt the same thing on every flight." He said that this might be a "mistake" on their part and that "sometimes we get lucky."

The implication seemed to be that while he was convinced that much of

while he was convinced that much of the coding was contrary to 1979 treaty provisions, the United States had been able to gather evidence of still other purported infractions concerning the capabilities of new Soviet weapons.

The New Missile Issue

On the issue of new missiles, the 1979 On the issue of new missiles, the 1979 treaty permits each nation to deploy only one new light intercontinental ballistic missile. The MX is the new United States missile. The Soviet Union has been flight-testing and will soon begin to deploy a 10-warhead missile called the SS-24, and it has told the United States that it this is the new Soviet missile

Soviet missile.

But the Soviet Union has also been flight-testing — and is now in the process of deploying — a solid-fuel, three-stage missile with a single warhead, which the United States calls the SS-25. The Russians contend that this is simply a modification of the older SS-13.

missile and is thus permitted. The Americans contend that it is a second new missile, and not permitted.

The treaty defines a new type of missile as one that differs from the older model in the type of fuel or number of stages or by more than 5 percent in

stages or by more than 5 percent in length, weight, largest diameter, launch weight or throw-weight.

Second Criterion for New Missile

Another provision is that any missile modification may not have a re-entry vehicle that is more than 50 percent lighter than the missile throw-weight. This provision was included to prevent development of a single warhead missile that could easily be modified to carry multiple warheads.

The Administration contends that it

has evidence the SS-25 violates both of these provisions, and is thus a second

new type of missile.
According to an article by Mr. Men-According to an article by Mr. Mendelsohn, the Soviet Union reportedly told the United States that the SS-13 has no separate "post-boost vehicle," or "bus," which is the device that dispenses warheads after separation from the last rocket stage. Instead, the Russlans say, part of the post-boost throwweight was on the third rocket stage.

By not taking this into consideration, the Russians contend, the United States assumes too low a throw-weight for the SS-13 and erroneously concludes that the throw-weight of the SS-25 exceeds that of the SS-13 by more than 5 percent. They Russians apparently also contend that the throw-weight of the SS-25 is even less than that of the SS-13. Secretary of State George P. Shultz seemed to concede some merit to the Soviet argument when he said in a television interview on March 18, 1985 that to him the SS-25 "is a clear new missile," but that "there are questions about whether in a purely technical sense it fits within treaty language as might be interpreted by a lawyer." As for the American argument about the low weight of the SS-25 re-entry vehicle in ratio to throw-weight, the Russians have reportedly told the Americans that a heavy instrumentation package in the test payload had reduced the re-entry vehicle's apparent percentage of the throw-weight. Critics contend that Gen. Richard H. Ellis, the delegate to the Soviet-American consultative panel that handles such disputes in Geneva, has not been getting instructions from the Pentagon on how to handle the issue.

such disputes in Geneva, has not open getting instructions from the Pentagon on how to handle the issue.
"He is authorized to complain, but is not authorized to resolve the issue," one expert said.

Joint Chiefs Favored Adherence

Joint Chiefs Favored Adherence
General Ellis and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been backing the 1979 treaty
terms on the ground that they set an
upper limit on Soviet weapons.
Senator Gore and Mr. Mendelsohn
contend that the SS-25 is being deployed
to replace single warhead SS-11 missiles and that it will not increase the
size of the Soviet strategic missile
forces. Because it can be mobile, it is
more survivable than a silo missile, but
may be less accurate. So it is not clear
that it constitutes a qualitative im-

forces. Because it can be mobile, it is more survivable than a silo missile, but may be less accurate. So it is not clear that it constitutes a qualitative improvement, in their view.

On the total size of nuclear forces, the United States accused the Soviet Union last February of a build-up beyond 2,504 delivery vehicles, the combined number of land-based and submarine missile launchers and bombers that the Soviet Union had when the 1979 pact was signed. The United States contended that the total rose to 2,540 during 1985, or by 36.

The arsenal totals used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their annual military posture statement this year made clear that the discrepancy actually involved 30 nearly obsolescent Soviet bombers that Moscow says have been converted to refueling tanker planes.

Now an arms control official says that since the Russians have taken "certain actions" with some of these planes, the total is down to 2,520, or 16 over the limit.

Some officials acknowledge that this issue is of no real significance and that it was raised to put another purported Soviet violation on the record. They say the the planes converted to tankers are included because they may easily be reconverted to bombers.

Representative Aspin, who is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said this spring that the purported Soviet violations "don't amount to a hill of beans" in military terms" and that President Reagan was in danger of "shooting himself in the foot" over them.